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1. Was the Left’s Thunder Stolen?  Soviet Short Films on British Wartime Screens 
 
When the Soviet Union entered the war against Nazi Germany, following the 22 June 
1941 invasion, it and Great Britain unexpectedly found themselves on the same side 
facing a common foe. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill spoke on the radio on 
the day of the invasion, saying that while Nazism and Communism are equally bad, 
and that he ‘will unsay no words’ of criticism of the Soviet system: ‘we shall give 
whatever help we can to Russia and to the Russian people.’ He ended his speech: 
‘The Russian danger is therefore our danger … just as the cause of any Russian 
fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in every 
quarter of the globe’ (Churchill 1948-54: 333). Within weeks, on 12 July a joint 
declaration was issued, followed by agreements for British civilian aid to the Soviet 
Union on 16 August, military aid in September 1941, and the signing of the Anglo-
Soviet Agreement on 26 May 1942 (Ross 1984: 14-15). 
In parallel to the governmental declaration of support and agreements, there was a 
widespread, unprompted upsurge of public sympathy for and interest in the Soviet 
Union in Britain (Soames 1981: 437). As one government memorandum put it: ‘[t]he 
most striking feature of the Anglo-Russian Weeks has been their spontaneity. People 
are anxious to show their appreciation of what Russia has done and are whole hearted 
in their admiration’.1 
However, just as Churchill made no mention of the Soviet Union, and did not 
‘unsay’ his criticism of Communism, so the British government was faced with the 
task of delivering on their promise to help ‘Russia’, and of communicating their 
support to the wider British population, but at the same time dealing with what 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden called ‘the more difficult question’ of controlling the 
political character of this support (Eden 1965: 270). 
It was the Ministry of Information that had the primary task of translating this 
stance into policy. Concluding that ‘the Russian motif is now more important than 
any other,’2 the Ministry of Information and the British government established and 
conducted its own campaign of pro-Soviet propaganda, in order not to let such 
activities fall under the control of British Communists, thereby, as they put it, 
‘stealing the thunder of the Left’ and, they hoped, countering the potential attraction 
of Communist ideas and the Communist model of society.3 Paradoxically, however, at 
least one of those charged with negotiating this fine balance, Peter Smollett, was 
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himself a spy working for the Soviets, with the result that their portrayal ended up 
being even more friendly to the Soviets than the British intended (Miner 2003).  
Yet, while the activities of the Ministry of Information, and the Anglo-Soviet 
Alliance have attracted no small amount of scholarly attention, the emphasis has been 
on the diplomatic relations, the military and economic side (Bell 1990;MacLaine 
1979;Fenby 2006;Ross 1984). So overwhelming has this emphasis been that the 
widely acclaimed new abridgement of Maisky’s diaries, based on the whole 
manuscript, unfortunately excludes almost all references to his engagement in the soft 
diplomacy of culture and propaganda (Maisky 2015). Until recently, considerations of 
film have occupied a particularly marginal place in considerations of British cultural 
policy during the war. This omission is paradoxical when we consider film’s 
prominence in this period. Writing in 1935, British documentary pioneer John 
Grierson argued that contemporary society needed ‘more imaginative and widespread 
media of public address’ than ‘public speech and public writing’, and that propaganda 
tendencies in cinema would increasingly offer this (Grierson 1966: 185). While there 
have been important studies of cinema in wartime Britain, they have paid scant 
attention to the British wartime reception of Soviet film (Chapman 1998). In the years 
of the Anglo-Soviet alliance, however, film proved an especially important medium 
for the communication of the British government’s complex policy on Soviet Russia: 
it was attractive with audiences for its combination of immediacy with authenticity, 
but also attractive to governments as a reliable transmission belt for a carefully 
calibrated message. No other medium could offer quite this package. Yet it is only 
through a comparative approach, examining the films themselves through the prism of 
both Russian and British archival and memoir sources, as well as historical accounts, 
that we can grasp the specific and important role that film played in the Anglo-Soviet 
alliance, as an arena where the bigger tensions between the respective regimes’ 
contrasting political perspectives were played out.  As is clear from a comparison of 
the role of short film with that of other prominent media of the time, when it came to 
the government’s policy on communicating its support for the Soviet Union in the 
first eighteen months after the Soviets entered the war, short films played a crucial 
role as an authentically Russian source the message and distribution of which could 
still be controlled. As such, analysis of it can tentatively suggest whether the Ministry 
of Information really succeeded, as they intended, in stealing the thunder of the Left, 
and what effects this had on British society. 
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1.1 ‘Speak objectively and with authority on Russia’: The Role of the Short 
The key to the Ministry of Information’s strategy to curb a grassroots or uncontrolled 
movement for solidarity with the Soviet Union, was to work with the Russian 
Embassy from the outset, to ensure that their speakers and materials, and hence 
events, having come direct from Russia, were implicitly assumed to enjoy greater 
legitimacy than those of British Communists: 
 
The Ministry will need to lead propaganda for Anglo-Soviet co-operation so skilfully that the 
thunder of the extreme Left is stolen, and, in developing the closest liaison with the Soviet 
Embassy, our attitude to the British Communist Party as one of non co-operation will be 
strengthened. Above all things the Russians are realists and they know that any assistance they get 
from Great Britain is due to the existence of the Capitalistic System.4 
 
The stress was on factual information about Russia so as ‘to let each other’s 
populations draw as much inspiration from their Ally’s effort as possible. In order to 
do so the Ministry encourages and assists the distribution of factual information about 
Russia in Britain and about Britain in Russia.’5 An obvious way this factual 
orientation could be delivered was by the translation, reprinting, and reuse of Soviet 
press reports. Soviet ambassador Ivan Maisky suggested that the Soviets’ decision to 
produce print publications Soviet War News and Soviet War News Weekly (circulation 
50,000), followed by Soviet Weekly, was taken with the purpose of giving the Soviet 
side of things to balance that presented by the British, and to counter, in particular, an 
initially defeatist atmosphere in Britain with regard to the USSR’s capacity to 
withstand the Germans in Summer 1941 (Maisky 1967: 206). This started with war 
news solely, but moved to other spheres including culture, science, and economics. 
While Claire Knight points to a shift, during the summer of 1941 from the distrust of 
Soviet sources, to a tendency to quote communiqués verbatim, (Knight 2013: 484), 
most articles required substantial adaptation, and Maisky discusses the difficulties 
faced by the editors of  these publications in transforming the items sent from the 
Russian press into something that could be read and appreciated by the British 
(Maisky 1967: 207). In part this was a question of format: Maisky cites a British 
distaste for long articles and figures by comparison with the Soviet press, but there 
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was a need to adapt Soviet newspaper articles, not only in stylistic but also in 
ideological terms.  
While reprinting the Soviet press was fairly straightforward, widely practiced, and 
easily controllable, it did not offer the emotive appeal and direct presence possible 
with a live speaker at a public meeting. Consequently, the Ministry of Information, 
and a number of other organisations intent on promoting friendly relations with the 
newfound Soviet ally, immediately started sourcing speakers for public meetings. 
Maisky referred to the enormous number of invitations to speak that he received in 
this period, one hundred in January 1942 alone, and wrote that it was obviously 
impossible to attend to them all (Maisky 1967: 212, 250). Other than Maisky, there 
was, however, a shortage of suitable speakers who could, in the opinion of the 
Ministry of Information, ‘speak objectively and with authority on Russia.’6 
The desire for speakers from Russia is repeated in a further internal discussion in 
the Ministry of Information: 
 
The provision of some Russian speakers direct from that country at this time would 
completely eclipse any efforts under ‘C’ of Mr Parker’s statement and the effect might well be 
electrical of having some Russians ‘direct from Moscow’ to visit factories and speak at 
demonstrations throughout the country’.7 
 
What is being referred to here (‘under “C”’) are the efforts of Communists, who 
unlike the Ministry, could not get ‘Russians’ directly from Moscow through the 
Embassy, and would thus evidently be eclipsed by any such speakers. Unfortunately, 
to compound the difficulties involved, particularly in 1941-42, in getting speakers 
from Moscow, the Soviet Embassy was reluctant to permit any officials other than 
Maisky to speak in public, for fear that they might say the wrong thing (Miner 2003: 
376). Eventually, the Ministry of Information decided not to go ahead with the idea of 
inviting speakers directly from Russia, as impractical at this point in the war. This left 
them overwhelmed: ‘Demands for speakers on Russia have been almost more than the 
Ministry could meet. Interest in Russia at one period was greater than the interest in 
all the other Allies put together — in December 1941 there were 128 Ministry 
meetings on Russia compared with 123 on all the other Allies’, and those sometimes 
included Russians.8 
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Evidently the main concerns were to have speakers with the authority of first-hand 
experience of Russia, and the correct politics. Indeed, what they ideally needed, 
suggested Briggs, more than actual Russians, would be MPs who have visited Russia: 
‘It would be particularly useful to have 20 or 30 Conservative M.P.s willing to talk on 
the subject’.9 However, given the dearth of suitably prepared Tory MPs, or speakers 
from Russia, those organising activities in support of Russia continued to be besieged 
with offers to speak about Russia from Communists, including the leader of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain, Harry Pollitt.10 Needless to say, given the whole 
thrust of its policy, the Ministry rejected such offers, but this selectiveness did nothing 
to solve the problem of the lack of speakers. 
This picture was further complicated by the fact that the Soviet Relations Division 
of the Ministry of Information, was being run by Soviet mole Smollett, who was 
vetting speakers, stopping émigrés or anyone potentially critical of Stalin from 
speaking (Miner 2003: 248). This extra check upon potential speakers protracted 
matters further and did little to dispel the impression, indeed fostered the suspicion, 
that the British Government was not really doing enough, as a memorandum put it on 
21 October 1941: 
 
It was generally agreed that we are not conducting a campaign in the sense of Press 
advertisements, billposting and the other usual commercial methods. It was agreed that there 
is a great market of interest in all things Russian at the present, but as there is a great section 
of the population which believes that the government itself does not share the enthusiasm of 
the country for our Russian Ally our primary purpose is to convince the public that the 
Government is going all out in its policy of aid to Russia. 
It is urgently necessary that immediate steps be taken to this end as other organisations of 
Left Wing tendency are capturing public sympathy. The Ministry must, accordingly, out-
produce all other organisations which are trying to satisfy the present interest in Russian 
affairs.11 
 
To fulfil the urgent need for material, the Ministry of Information made extensive 
use of film, especially short films, to get across its pro-Soviet message.  
 
1.2 The Rise of Soviet Short Films 
By 1943 Soviet footage amounting to 40,000 feet had been included in British 
commercial newsreels shown to weekly audiences of 24 million in public cinema 
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from the very first weeks of June 1941.12 Soviet features, both documentary and 
fiction, soon followed onto British screens, and were by far the most widely 
consumed expressions of Soviet cinema, but British commercial filmmakers were 
very conservative when it came to the Soviet subject matter, despite one or two efforts 
(Chapman 1998: 220). Moreover, the British were initially cautious of feature length 
films in general for propaganda purposes, and therefore tended to prioritise the 
distribution of shorts at the beginning of the war (Fox 2007: 33). During the whole 
course of the war, 1,400 ‘official’ short films, including at least 20 Soviet ones, were 
distributed by the Ministry of Information be it for the commercial cinemas or non-
commercial network (Chapman 1998: 86).  
In this context, it is clear why so strong an appetite for adapting and distributing 
Soviet short films emerges from the correspondence in the Ministry of Information 
files, and later from conversations held between the British Embassy in Moscow and 
representatives of the Russian film industry, at the bidding of the Ministry of 
Information. It seems, however, that these films were largely for the non-commercial 
travelling network later dubbed, the Ministry of Information’s ‘Celluloid Circus.’ 
This comprised a network of 70 mobile projectors which moved from town to town 
each giving 10 shows a week  ‘to every sort of audience from large factory canteens 
holding 1,500 people to small village shows of about 80 people’ with an average 
audience of 150. By early 1942, the Ministry estimated that 3,000,000 had seen these 
shows at some time.13 
While this dimension of wartime British propaganda film consumption was long 
held to have little value by historians compared to more celebrated features, and it has 
been estimated that whereas the cinemas reached 24 million a week, the non-theatrical 
distribution reached 0.36 million a week at its peak in 1943-44 (Thorpe, Pronay, and 
Coultass 1980: 37-38), James Chapman, however, has persuasively made the case that 
the short documentary films ‘were no less important than commercial feature films; 
they just served a different purpose.’ However, this account too hesitates to draw 
conclusions about the effectiveness of the non-theatrical network due to the difficulty 
of determining audience size (Chapman 1998: 112-13).  
Nevertheless, from the point of view of the Ministry of Information, distributing 
Soviet films in this way had a whole host of advantages: they were able to respond to 
the appetite for Soviet-themed materials relatively quickly. Moreover, given this 
appetite, the Soviet films were more attractive to the public than most short films, 
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they cost little or nothing to prepare, and distribution on the non-theatrical circuit 
fulfilled the policy need to be seen to do something about the Soviet Union, with a 
minimum of investment and without the risk of directly endorsing, of doing too much 
and popularising the Soviet Union or the ideas of Communism unduly. 
Finally, as a medium, which in this period required enormous investment, the 
resources required by film made it even better suited to countering the influence of 
the British Communists, who could rarely afford to make such films, even if they had 
distributed Soviet films earlier on their own non-theatrical, film club, circuits. Thus 
the government, with the help of the Soviet Embassy, turned Soviet film from a 
weapon in the hands of the Left in the 1920s and 1930s, into a crucial tool to counter 
the influence of the left, and further their own approach: 
 
The Ministry intended, however, that the country’s interest should not be engrossed by the 
Communist presentation of Russia and from this it followed that the Ministry must present Russia 
factually and more interestingly than any private enterprise did.  
 
Films 
a) It was noted that Films Division are going ahead with the production of films on 
Russia and that material is gradually becoming available. 
b) The need for films to be made available for the non-theatrical scheme was stressed 
and it was noted that arrangements for this were already in hand.14 
 
The remit to be factual, implying that it was not to articulate an explicitly political 
message, was repeated, and strongly echoes the understanding of policy at a 
governmental level, as summed up in a conversation between Eden and Maisky in 
June 1941: 
 
…[Maisky] thought it would do the British public no harm to be given some information 
about the nature of the peoples that made up the Soviet Union, their ways of life, their 
traditions and so forth. [Eden] replied that as long as we vigorously eschewed political 
propaganda [he] thought there might be some advantage to such a course (MacLaine 1979: 
197). 
 
This emphasis was particularly suited to the non-theatrical circuit. Whereas shorts 
oriented towards regular commercial cinemas were fitted into a five-minute slot, and 
heavily oriented towards ‘the MOI’s immediate propaganda and instructional needs’ 
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(Chapman 1998: 93), the Soviet films served a different, less time-sensitive goal of 
acquainting the audience with some background information about the Soviet Union, 
Britain’s powerful new ally. This purpose meant films could be shown for months, 
since they did not relate to specific campaigns, but, rather, suited long-term, ‘on-
going’ themes. So it did not matter that it took these films a long time to get round the 
network.15 They were also less time sensitive in another sense: they did not need to fit 
into a rigid five-minute slot, and often took up around ten minutes, a whole reel.  
However, it was not until November 1941 that any such films were ready.16 While 
most of the shorts were adapted in London by The Soviet War News Film Agency, 
under Russian speaking VGIK graduate, Herbert Marshall, one of the first five films 
prepared at the request of the MOI, by British Pathé, was a compilation entitled Salute 
to the Soviet. It possessed topical qualities that enabled it to be shown theatrically as 
well as part of the ‘Celluloid Circus.’  
 
1.3 Salute to the Soviet 
The emphasis in Salute to the Soviet upon the factual and instructional is 
immediately evident from its initial description of the Soviet Union’s geographical 
features: ‘occupying a sixth of the World’s earth surface. Its coastline borders seven 
seas.’ This fairly anodyne opening was precisely kind of thing that the British 
governmental circles were looking for, as is evident from a 1942 letter from British 
Embassy press attaché, John W. Lawrence, to the Soviets specifying the kinds of 
subjects they wanted to see in Soviet short films: 
 
What is familiar to a Soviet audience is, however, often strange and (at first sight) 
incomprehensible to a British audience, for instance the extremes of heat and cold and the great size 
and flatness of the country create conditions utterly strange to our people.17  
 
While the film contains lots of factual statement of the kind it opens with, it is not 
long before the border between fact and political interpretation becomes blurred, as 
the voice-over narration states: ‘Not long ago it was a prosperous and peaceful land, 
where everyone went about their daily tasks happily and contentedly.’ Most of this is 
highly contentious, of course, since the previous decade had seen forced 
collectivisation, famine, mass terror, and the Soviet Union’s own invasion of a 
number of neighbouring countries all of which belie notions of a peaceful, prosperous 
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land or a happy and contented populace. Indeed, despite Britain at this point refusing 
to recognise the annexation of the Baltic States in 1940, the film presents a catalogue 
of ethnic diversity, listing Lithuanians as one of the national groups of the USSR. 
This approach to the Soviet Union’s multiple constituent nationalities was itself at 
odds with the overwhelming tendency in Britain, legitimised from the top by 
Churchill’s 22 June 1941 speech, to refer to the USSR as Russia, rather than the 
Soviet Union, so as to underplay, and not to invite sympathy for, the political 
character of its Socialist regime. The film continues in this vein, talking up life in the 
USSR and remaining silent over its problems, creating a temporally vague, but 
relentlessly idealised picture of Soviet society. The film ends with Maisky giving a 
speech, which brings the apparently generic factual and instructional survey up-to-
date, referring to the Nazi invasion. His message was that Russia is strong, and is 
fighting the same fight as ‘you’: a more overtly propagandistic message delivered 
straight to camera. It was Salute to the Soviet’s combining of the factual and 
instructional with the topical and overtly political that enabled it also to appeal to 
audiences in theatrical release.  
However, Salute to the Soviet immediately illustrates the problem with the 
Ministry’s policy: as Bell has argued with regard to Soviet material in British 
newsreels of the period, the dividing line between the factual presentation of the 
Soviet ally and the political endorsement were highly ambiguous, since emphasis on 
the successes of Soviet military was not without political implications: ‘here was not 
just a great army but a strong society, drawing inspiration from its ideals’(Bell 1990: 
73). The Minister for Information, Duff Cooper, was also aware of the problem, as he 
put it: ‘It is difficult to see how we could boost modern Russian culture without 
implying some approval of the experiment that has been going on there for these last 
24 years’ (MacLaine 1979: 197). It was almost impossible to resolve this dilemma: if 
Soviet films were going to be shown, they were bound to have some effect on the 
public. 
 
1.4 Women in Soviet Shorts 
One theme in Maisky’s speech that particularly resonated with British audiences 
was that of the role of women. In Salute to the Soviet, the diplomat frames his account 
in relatively traditional and familiar terms of women replacing men in factories and 
tending to the wounded at the front. However, as the role of women expanded during 
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the conflict, this would be a dimension of Soviet portrayals that was to have deeper 
impact on British audiences. In view of this, it was no accident that another of the first 
five short films acquired by the MOI was a film called Soviet Women.18 It is probably 
indicative of its success, that this was followed by an apparently similar 1942 film 
titled 100 Million Women (Directed, or re-edited from Soviet footage, by Jiri Weiss) 
(Thorpe, Pronay, and Coultass 1980: 119). Part of these films’ appeal was the context 
of their reception: while the British had already began the mobilisation of women in 
March 1941, when all women between 19 and 40 were required to register at 
employment exchanges, female conscription was only introduced from December 
1941 (Rose 2003: 109). This was echoed in the media by an uncertainty as to whether 
to emphasise women’s traditional roles as carers and mothers, or to celebrate and 
promote women’s participation in the war effort in more novel, active roles. Indeed 
there was even an indecision as to whether to address women directly at all in 
propaganda (Chapman 1998: 202-03), an ambivalence that reflected hostility even in 
the trade union and labour movements as to advances in women’s employment rights 
(Branson 1997: 41-42). 
The Soviet film depictions of women both bypassed this hesitancy, and exposed its 
limitations. On seeing the film’s images of women working the land and the 
especially striking images of women fighting in the army, one reviewer of 100 
Million Women, Edith Manvell, was not just full of praise for the film, contrasting it 
with British short documentary films devoted to women in the Royal Navy and 
British Army: W.R.N.S. and W.V.S. Manvell also argues that, whereas the British 
films pay great attention to creating an image of women as refined middle class types 
in smart uniforms, the Russian film, for the most part, shows ‘tough, working-class 
types.’ What impresses Manvell most about the film, though, is its attempt to suggest 
the women’s motivations:  
 
Several times during the film we are made aware of their indomitable courage […] Those parts 
of the film which deal with military and defence services are not represented as parades in uniform 
but show us the grim determination on women’s faces and the arduous nature of their work 
(Manvell 1942). 
 
Inspired by the contrast in such representations to reflect on the barriers holding 
women back in Britain, Manvell concludes that one of those obstacles was precisely 
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the lack of propaganda of this very welcome kind, which inspired women’s belief in 
the importance of their tasks. In Manvell’s view the dearth of such images had the 
consequence that: 
 
People are not yet quite sure whether they are working for a victory that will take us back to 
1939, or whether victory will bring an opportunity for righting the social and economic evils of the 
past. This is the problem that makes so much of our propaganda ineffectual (Manvell 1942). 
 
While 100 Million Women might not have been deliberately conceived of as 
political propaganda, but rather as a film showing women’s participation in the Soviet 
war effort, depictions like this evidently did have an effect beyond the mere bolstering 
of support for the Soviet ally: they also stimulated domestic British thoughts and 
concerns, serving to promote social change and debate. The Ministry’s own files note 
this process: 
 
The M.O.I’s “Celluloid Circus” … is creating again the market place discussion; the public forum 
is returning to village and town alike with a new orator-film, to lead a lively and well-informed 
discussion of the country’s wartime problems.19  
 
Curiously, both 100 Million Women and Salute to the Soviet end with direct 
addresses to the audience from a Russian in heavily accented English, in the second 
person form, mimicking live speech, or the oratory in terms of which these films are 
described above. Here film was perfectly suited to conveying the authority and 
authenticity, as well as the directness and immediacy, of a speaker direct from 
‘Russia’. It seems this was vital in the context of such culturally and geographically 
distant allies, and evidently, this could stimulate much debate.  
However, unlike a live speaker, a film can be relied upon to relay the same 
message time after time: this was key when delivering the complex and at times 
contradictory nature of the Anglo-Soviet alliance to spectators. Probably the most 
controversial subject of pro-Soviet propaganda in Britain that the government wanted 
to avoid was mention of the second front. As Churchill told Maisky on 5 September 
1941, the ‘only result would be rough reaction and recrimination all would wish to 
avoid’ (Eden 1965: 276). A live speaker, especially one direct from the USSR might 
well end up mentioning this, but film could be vetted beforehand. Thus, later in the 
war, the Ministry refused to distribute Stalin’s 25th anniversary of the Revolution 
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speech unless mention of the second front was cut. The Soviets refused to show an 
edited version, and produced their own 16 mm print, to be shown to ‘organisations 
friendly to us’.20  
Despite, or perhaps because of such censorship, the success of these Soviet short 
films with the viewing public was clear. By February, the Ministry were able to boast 
that ‘Russian films have been a tremendous success throughout the country’.21 Salute 
to the Soviet and Soviet Women were among 5 Soviet films in the non-theatrical 
programme, and, although figures vary, by March 1942 had been seen by more than 
half of the three million who saw these films: ‘all these films have been very popular 
indeed at the shows. As long as we have new films on U.S.S.R., they will go into 
every programme put on in factories’.22 Consequently, the MOI sought to obtain more 
Soviet short films through Ivor Montagu, described in a letter from Smollett as ‘film 
affairs adviser of the U.S.S.R.,’23 and then through the British Embassy in Moscow. 
Despite the British appetite for Soviet short films, and the Soviet appetite to show 
them as widely as possible, finding new ones proved difficult. 
 
1. 5 The Decline of Soviet Shorts 
In the understanding of British officials, there existed from the moment the Soviets 
entered the war as an ally of Britain, a principle of barter for short films and newsreels 
between the two countries.24 However, while this had effectively been the case, it had 
marked a significant shift in approach, as Petr Brigadnov was appointed the new 
representative of the Soviet film export organization, Soiuzintorgkino, in Britain in 
November 1941, he took the step of combining the organisations for the distribution 
of newsreel and documentary film on the one hand, and of fiction feature films on the 
other. The latter were under the control of the trade commission, and put under the 
political control of the Embassy. As Brigadnov put it: 
 
From past experience it was completely clear, that the basic mistake of “Soiuzintorgkino” 
was that films were treated as normal export goods such as timber, oil or manganese ore, and 
consequently the whole operation was based solely on commercial considerations. Yet practice 
had shown that this approach to the matter restricted the already limited possibilities that existed 
for the promotion of Soviet films abroad. Officials needed to understand that films are not 
commercial products, but profoundly ideological ones, because our films reflect the struggle for 
socialist rebuilding of our country according to completely different principles and methods 
than those of capitalist countries. This is why capitalist countries do not want Soviet films to be 
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shown on a mass scale, because our films revolutionise the laboring classes. For these reasons I 
rejected the old methods of trading films as a normal export, and made the political question 
central: to get our films onto British screens any way we could (Brigadnov 2005). 
 
Whatever changes Brigadnov did or did not introduce, by January 1942, Three in a 
Fox Hole (Troe v voronke) had already become the first Soviet film to appear as an 
MOI five-minute short in the commercial cinema network (Anon 1942). It may be 
that following this success, the Soviets were no longer interested in distributing their 
films through the non-theatrical network. Certainly the supply of films for non-
theatrical distribution worsened. Lawrence expressed his anxieties over the supply to 
Britain of short films: 
 
Short films are not easy to dispose of in the British commercial market, and yet the requests of 
the Ministry for short films and film material for its own non-commercial distribution have not been 
met satisfactorily. It is realised that the Soviet War News Film Agency makes no profit on films 
supplied to the Ministry, but their general publicity value, taking a long term view, would possibly 
outweigh immediate commercial considerations. The Ministry’s experience suggests that the Soviet 
War News Film Agency could in many cases make commercial contracts which allowed concurrent 
non-theatrical use.25 
 
He even goes as far as to say that the main concern of the Soviets is now to exploit 
these films commercially, and were no longer willing to supply these films to the non-
commercial network, something the British Embassy officials had already complained 
about the previous year.26 It seems that, despite a peak of 11 films in 1942, rising 
from 7 in 1941, the MOI was unable to source new Soviet films for 1943, and this is 
presumably why the most comprehensive catalogue of films distributed by the MOI 
during the war contains no Russian shorts for 1943 (Thorpe, Pronay, and Coultass 
1980). 
This tension may also be seen in the light of a wider reversion in Anglo-Soviet 
relations to pragmatism, and suspicion. In the cultural sphere, it seems that both sides 
suddenly realised the potential in the other market for the penetration of their 
products, and hence their influence. The British thought that they might continue to 
obtain the Soviet films virtually free, as Left-wing organisations had done prior to the 
war, but the Soviets, seeing a market, immediately wanted to exploit it economically. 
They were much more pragmatic, committed to realpolitik and the bottom line in 
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economic terms, and much less ideologically driven, than the British tended to 
imagine.  
While this can be seen as related to the turn away from internationalism and 
towards ‘National Bolshevism’, discussed below, in fact this logic also stretches back 
to the 1930s, when the exporting of film to Britain was primarily seen as an economic 
opportunity, rather than an opportunity to exert political and cultural influence: the 
Soviets would only give films away if they could not sell them, and only then after 
waiting some years (Hicks 2005: 283). The desperate straits of the war’s initial 
existential threat shook that logic, but not for long, and not irreversibly, so that after 
military success at the 1942 Battle of Moscow had ensured the USSR’s survival, 
normal business resumed; the need to make economic rather than just political capital 
soon prevailed once more.27 That this commercial option had become a reality was 
confirmed not only by the success of Three in a Fox Hole, but also by the film The 
Defeat of the Germans Near Moscow (Razgrom nemetskikh voisk pod Moskvoi, 
1942), which reedited as Moscow Strikes Back for the US market, won an Oscar. This 
focused attentions away from non-theatrical shorts (Kapterev 2015).  
For their part, the MOI had hoped to ‘steal the thunder of the Left,’ and in so doing 
had also inherited the same problems faced by the Left in dealing with the Soviets’ 
unique cocktail of cynicism and idealism. The British themselves combined these 
qualities in their own way by evidently hoping that they could supply their 
economically loss-leading non-theatrical circuit with effectively free Soviet films, 
which was obviously better than having to spend a lot of money on their own 
productions (Chapman 1998: 270, n. 69). Distributing Soviet films in this way might 
also have the advantage of being seen to be ‘sparing no effort’ whereas, had these 
films been distributed in commercial cinemas they might run the risk of exerting more 
influence. The sense that the British are interested more in ‘the impression’ of 
promoting Russia, than in actually doing so comes across in some MOI internal 
correspondence: 
 
The argument is this. We are not trying to sell Russia to the people. They are already sold to the 
idea. What we are trying to do is to make it crystal clear that the Government is going all out in its 
policy of aid to Russia. If we, as a Government Department working in the interests of the 
Government stage an inferior exhibition, people will say, ‘That is exactly what we have been 
maintaining all along, that the Government is not really heart and soul in this business.’ But if we 
stage a really first class show it will give the impression that we are after, i.e. that we are sparing no 
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effort in a matter which is something of vital importance to the British Government, i.e. the whole 
question of Russia and its War Effort.28 
 
For their part, the Soviets never overcame their suspicion of British motives: even 
in August 1941, Stalin described Britain as objectively helping Germany by not 
immediately opening a second front (Stalin 2015: 639). Thus, the Soviets barely even 
gave the impression of promoting Britain, and rarely showed any of the short films 
dubbed into Russian that the British sent them, apart from to a specially invited 
audience of industry figures, and only then after the British Embassy had hectored 
them to do so.29 One exception to this was the inclusion of a dubbed version of 
probably the most celebrated British short film of the war:  ‘London Can Take it,’ 
which was combined with a Soviet film about the bombing and defence of Moscow 
under the title in Britain of A Tale of Two Cities. This was shown as part of Fighting 
Film Journal (Boevoi kinosbornik) No. 5, released in the USSR in October 1941. 
However, despite aspirations, particularly by the British, to expand into co-
productions, the mutual suspicion and differences between the two sides was such, 
that no such productions ever proved possible. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
In attempting to assess the effects of the Ministry of Information’s policy on Soviet 
propaganda, Steven Merritt Miner criticises previous considerations of the Ministry of 
Information by Bell and McLaine for taking at face value the claim that the Ministry 
was ‘stealing the thunder of the Left’ when Smollett, the Soviet mole, was in fact 
working behind the scenes to undermine this very policy, and promote Soviet interests 
as far as possible (Miner 2003: 375, n.9). Certainly, at times anxieties were raised that 
the Ministry was going too far in promoting the USSR, and there were repeated calls 
to stress the differences between British and Soviet positions.  No seems to respond to 
them, and it may well be that this was a result of the influence of Smollett, leading us 
to agree that the Soviets exerted at least some influence over British policy. However, 
on the evidence of film propaganda, it is hard to agree with the claim that: ‘Smollett 
gave events a shove in the right direction, more important than the Cambridge spies’ 
(Miner 2003: 278).  
Certainly, while it is probable that Smollett did further the interests of the Soviet 
Union, ensuring British portrayals were even more positive than would otherwise 
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have been the case; this is not the same thing as the side effect most feared by British 
governmental officials: 
 
The great danger that lies before us at the moment is that the popularisation of Russia (or its 
popularity) must, if it is not interfered with, equally popularise Communism as a method of living.30  
 
Miner’s study certainly gives us no evidence that Smollett’s actions helped 
forward the Communist ideal of living, even if membership of the Communist Party 
of Great Britain reached a historic peak of 56,000 by the end of 1942, it was in 
decline thereafter (Branson 1997: 252).  
However, it has been claimed that the positive portrayal of Russian feats of arms, 
and the British media and public’s ‘hysterical magnification of their successes’ had 
the unexpected effect of boosting Russian self belief and made negotiations difficult 
for British diplomats (Ross 1984: 93). Here we are confronted with the paradox that 
the British line on the Soviet war effort, whereby the whole country is identified as 
Russia, and the Communist system is downplayed, was one that was very much a part 
of how the Soviet ruling elites themselves were starting to see and portray things — 
perceiving the war as essentially a Russian enterprise that reflected Russian martial 
endeavour, and had little or nothing to do with Communism and the Marxist way of 
thinking. While, as David Brandenberger has argued persuasively, what he calls the 
wartime escalation in Soviet propaganda of ‘etatist’, ‘neonationalism’ was ‘a 
tendency rather than an articulate central line’, it was no less pronounced for all that 
(Brandenberger 2002: 120). 
An illustration of this evolving situation was the fate of the Internationale, which 
was the National Anthem of the Soviet Union and which the BBC refused to play on 
its Sunday slot for broadcasting the national anthems of allied powers. Duff Cooper 
tried, in June 1941, to persuade Maisky that ‘to call the “Internationale” a national 
anthem was a contradiction in terms (MacLaine 1979: 200-01). Yet this obstacle to 
the Soviet Union’s rising international prestige was removed within 18 months, as it 
was replaced by the more statesmanlike ‘Hymn of the Soviet Union,’ the second line 
of which referred to ‘Rus’ as uniting the other republics into the Union.  
The policy of referring primarily to Russia, and not the Soviet Union, far from 
depoliticising it, was itself, of course political, since a nationalist vision of timeless 
Russia is also a political idea, just as much as Communism. The irony was that this 
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idea gained ground in the Soviet Union too, as this russocentric vision of the Soviet 
state, the one endorsed by Churchill from 22 June 1941 well before its endorsement 
by Stalin in his 7 November 1941 speech, became so influential in Soviet thinking 
(Brandenberger 2002: 118). Perhaps, rather than Britain becoming infected with the 
feared Communist contagion, paradoxically it was the British who helped spread the 
Russian nationalist bacillus in the Soviet Union. 
Conversely, if we attempt to consider more closely whether any of the distinctly 
Communist ideas present in Soviet propaganda were echoed in changes to British 
society, we might draw on the debate as to what dimensions of the wartime 
experience influenced the societal shift that occurred during the war	which brought 
the 1945 Labour government, Britain’s most left wing and socially reforming ever, to 
power. One response to this question has found, in the re-examination of women’s 
roles, a partial explanation for the rising demands for social rights and social security 
articulated in Labour’s vision for a welfare state (Rose 2003: 149). It seems no 
coincidence that Manvell’s asserts, in her discussion of 100 Million Women, that 
‘victory will bring an opportunity for righting the social and economic evils of the 
past’. It may be that these films played a part in the dynamic of regime competition 
that, it has been argued, was crucial in the formation and development of post-war 
welfare states (Obinger and Schmitt 2011). 
The Soviet depictions of women in film were strikingly different to those in the 
British media, as we have seen. British women referenced the images of Soviet 
female combatants, consumed in part through film, to justify their desire to take an 
active part in all dimensions of life, even in battle (Rose 2003: 109). Anna Krylova, in 
an important study of Soviet female combatants in World War Two, has argued that 
the fact that the Soviets put more than half a million women into combat, a far greater 
number than any other country, was a consequence of the reassessment of gender 
brought about by the 1917 revolution, leading to the perception that identities as 
women and as fighters were not necessarily in conflict (Krylova 2010: 16). In turn, it 
has been argued that their greater effectiveness than the Axis powers in mobilising 
women was one reason why the Allies, including the Soviets, won (Black 2015: 99). 
If this is so, then it may be that the apparently irrelevant, innocuous Soviet 
propaganda short films exerted a tiny, but palpable effect not only on the peace, but 
also on the very outcome of the war. So maybe the Left’s thunder was stolen, but for 
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